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Abstract
Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a
bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a rm in exchange for a license may still
choose not to grant the rm that license (hold-up). This paper studies the role that
intermediaries play in facilitating bribery by preventing such hold-up. There are two
types of rms, good rms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful rms
that are not. In the absence of any intermediaries, because of the hold-up possibilities,
only good rms enter the market, and harmful rms do not. Intermediaries help rms
reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses, and thereby increase participation by
good rms. However, intermediaries can also use the legal aspects of their transaction
with good rms as leverage against the bureaucrat in order to prevent hold-up among
harmful rms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful
rms and their welfare costs are ambiguous.
JEL: D21, K42
Keywords: corruption, hold-up, middleman
1 Introduction
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Corrupt contracts are not enforceable in a court of law and are therefore vulnerable to hold-
up". That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a rm in exchange for issuing a
license or a permit may still choose not to grant the rm that license. In order to avoid this
problem rms frequently employ middlemen or intermediaries to facilitate corrupt transac-
tions. Thus, it has been argued that eliminating these intermediaries may make corruption
more di¢ cult, thereby reducing bribery (see Lambsdor¤ [2011] for a discussion of this is-
sue). This argument ignores the fact the intermediaries provide many legal services to rms.
A recent OECD study on the role of intermediaries in bribery asserts that intermediaries
provide many legitimate services to rms" despite the fact that they also engage in bribing
foreign o¢ cials" (OECD 2009). For example, because of their experience, intermediaries
may be able to legally lower the rms navigation cost of obtaining a permit. Indeed, the
Foreign Corruption Practices Act of the U.S. acknowledges this by allowing rms to make
facilitating payments for routine governmental action", including for issuing licenses, "that
are already required by law" (OMelveny 2009). However, intermediaries may also be able to
facilitate the bribing of o¢ cials (and prevent hold-up) in order to obtain a business permit
even when it is illegal to grant the rm such a permit. Indeed, as Lambsdor¤ and Teksoz
(2005) state,
a purely corrupt relationship is a rare thing. Corrupt deals are commonly em-
bedded in more complex relationships between di¤erent actors. More often than
not these relationships also entail a variety of legal transactions.
Other empirical studies of bribery also nd that intermediaries are employed to conduct
both legal and illegal services, sometimes for the same client and at other times for di¤erent
clients. Bjorvatn, Torsvik, and Tungodden (2005), in their study of corruption in Tanzania,
nd that former bureaucrats, who were red during an anti-corruption operation, become
intermediaries. These former bureaucrats use their former contacts to foster corrupt transac-
tions. In a recent audit study" of procuring drivers licenses in New Delhi, India, Bertrand et
al. (2007) nd that applicants often employ the services of intermediaries in order to obtain
their license. In this context, intermediaries are employed to speed-up the processing time
for a license, and enable their clients to procure a license even without taking the driving
test. Although their study does not have any direct evidence of bribery, it suggests that a
signicant fraction of the fees that clients pay intermediaries is passed on the bureaucrat in
the form of a bribe. Furthermore, based on the results of a subsequent driving test, they nd
that both good" drivers (who should receive a license) and poor" drivers (who should not),
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employ intermediaries in order to procure their license. Oldenburg (1987) similarly discusses
the role of intermediaries in facilitating bribe payments in a land consolidation program for
farmers in India. He nds that intermediaries are often used to pass on bribes to bureaucrats
from their clients. He observes that these bribes are sometimes paid to speed-up" perfectly
legal land consolidation applications, while in other cases intermediaries are employed to
facilitate improper or illegal land consolidation requests. Indeed, he states that the overall
transaction is proper even though the sub-transactions are corrupt."
In this paper we argue that the legal-illegal combination of the services that intermediaries
provide is a critical element of the mechanism that intermediaries employ to prevent hold-
up". We develop a model to show that intermediaries are able to prevent corrupt contracts
from being vulnerable to hold-up because they embed corrupt contracts within more complex,
partially legal, contracts. Thus, as Lambsdor¤ (2002) notes, many corrupt contracts occur in
the shadow of the law" where the legal transaction acts as a guarantor of the corrupt deal"
(Lambsdor¤, 2005). Specically, in our model intermediaries legally reduce the navigation
costs of seeking permits or licenses for rms. Hence intermediaries facilitate delivery of
permits to rms that are legally entitled to receive this permit. However, they also attempt
to obtain permits for rms that are not legally entitled to receive such permits. We show that
intermediaries can exploit this combination of legitimate and illegitimate services to enforce
occasional (i.e. one-shot) bribe contracts even in the presence of hold-up (and without
resorting to innitely repeated play or reputations).
To understand our intuition more clearly, consider a model with two types of rms: some
that are legally eligible to apply for a license and others that are not. Both types of rms are
subject to navigation costs that can be reduced by hiring the intermediary. A corruptible
bureaucrat issues permits buts incurs some positive cost in doing so. The bureaucrat can
withhold a permit from an eligible rm unless it is paid a bribe (extortion) or grant a license
to an ineligible rm in exchange for a bribe (bribery). Both types of rms are subject to hold-
up by the bureaucrat. Since we study a single period scenario, reputational concerns or other
repeated game enforcement mechanisms" cannot enforce the bribe contract, therefore, hold-
up by the bureaucrat is credible. However, the institutional setting allows rms, whether
eligible or ineligible, to appeal (at some cost) to a higher authority (or court) to request a
license if their application was previously denied. Because of the existence of the appeals
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process, eligible rms are not subject to any hold-up.1 However, since appeals are costly,
these rms do pay a positive bribe to receive the permit. The ineligible rm, on the other
hand, does not benet from the appeals process and, therefore, is likely to be held-up by the
bureaucrat after paying any bribe.
The solution to the hold-up problem is based on two key attributes associated with the
presence of an intermediary. First, the intermediary enjoys substantial economies of scale in
court costs so that once it goes to court, the costs of any future litigations are much lower.
Second, an intermediary can engage in collective bribe negotiation with the bureaucrat so
that if the bureaucrat fails to deliver the permit for a single rm, the intermediary can rene-
gotiate the bribe amount for the remaining client rms. Specically, suppose an intermediary
has both eligible and ineligible rms as its clients and negotiates a bribe amount with the
bureaucrat for a certain number of permits. The intermediary rst charges each rm an
up-front fee. It then processes the applications of the ineligible rms followed by the those of
the eligible rms (the latter acting as the carrot). In the event of hold-up (for any ineligible
rm), the intermediary can approach the court in order to prove that it made an honest
e¤ort to procure a license on behalf of the rm, thereby, avoiding any loss of reputation.
This decision to go to court triggers a renegotiation of the bribe which the intermediary has
to pay the bureaucrat for the (remaining) eligible rms. Since the bribe amount depends on
the court costs and costs exhibit returns to scale, this renegotiated bribe is lower following
any incident of hold-up.2 Thus, if the expected reduction in the future bribe from the inter-
mediary is greater than its benet from hold-up, the bureaucrat will not hold-up the licenses
of any ineligible rms. Further, the intermediary is never held-up for any eligible rm as it
can always approach the court to appeal against the non-issuance of permits.
After studying the conditions under which the above mechanism can prevent hold-up,
we also study the welfare implications of intermediaries. We show that in the absence of
1Our use of the term hold-up" should be distinguished from Lambert - Mogiliansky, Majumder, and
Radner (2007) and Choi and Thum (2004). These papers refer to hold-up" as the practice (by bureaucrats)
of denying licenses to rms that are legally entitled to receive those licenses unless they are paid a bribe. In
contrast, we identify this behavior as extortion and refer to hold-up as the practice of denying rms licenses
to rms after they have paid a bribe, and irrespective of whether they are legally entitled to receive the
license or not.
2Note that the intermediary will approach the court irrespective of whether the denied rm is eligible or
ineligible. Failure to do so damages its reputation. We can relax this assumption and generate committment
through contractual means, as done in an earlier version. We thank a referee for the current interpretation.
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intermediaries only a subset of legally eligible rms receive licenses, and that hold-up prevents
ineligible rms from entering the market. In the presence of intermediaries the navigation
costs for rms are lowered. As a result, more eligible rms enter the market. However, since
intermediaries also provide services to illegal rms and enable them to solve" the hold-up
problem, the number of illegal rms also increases in the presence of intermediaries. Hence,
the number of rms of both types increases in the presence of intermediaries, and to the
extent the presence of ineligible rms is welfare reducing, there is a trade-o¤ to eliminating
intermediaries altogether.
Although, to our knowledge, ours is the rst model to consider this mechanism using
legal-illegal interface, there is a sizeable literature on the type of bureaucratic corruption
that is studied in this paper.3 The majority of these papers study the policy implications of
bribery and do not explicitly model the transaction process of bribe contracts or the means
by which they are enforced. More recent papers attempt to bridge this gap in the literature
by studying the role of intermediaries. Bayar (2005), and similarly Bose and Gangopadhyay
(2009), examine the role of intermediaries in a model where some bureaucrats are corrupt
and others honest and where the identity of these corrupt bureaucrats is known only to
the intermediary (and not the rm). Firms that approach corrupt bureaucrats directly
may illegally receive a permit in exchange for a bribe, whereas rms that approach honest
bureaucrats are punished for attempted bribery. Thus, because of their knowledge regarding
the identity of bureaucrats, intermediaries lower the cost of bribery and are able to facilitate
corrupt transactions even in situations where most bureaucrats are honest. Although their
paper focuses on the informational" role of intermediaries it does not examine the role that
intermediaries may play in preventing hold-up". Hasker and Okten (2008) similarly study
the role of intermediaries in a model where rms may bribe bureaucrats directly, or through
an intermediary. Firms are subject to hold-up, but because of their repeated interaction
with bureaucrats, intermediaries are not subject to hold-up. In this context intermediaries
worsen the impact of corruption because they facilitate bribery even in situations where the
presence of hold-up would have otherwise prevented bribery from occurring.4
3See Mookherjee and Png (1995), Mishra (2008), and Samuel (2009) and the references therein for a
review of this literature.
4Other reasons for intermediaries have been proposed. Drugov et. al. (2011) nd experimental evidence
to support the hypothesis that intermediaries are used to lower the moral costs involved with corruption
transactions. See Co¤man (2011) for related study on intermediation and its impact on incentives.
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Although Hasker and Okten (2008) do not explicitly model the repeated-game between
the intermediary and the bureaucrat, it is clear that intermediaries who repeatedly interact
with bureaucrats can use trigger strategies to guarantee that the bureaucrat does not renege
on the bribe contract. Dechenaux and Samuel (2011) study the role of repeated play, while
Besley and McLaren (1993), Carillo (2000), and Tirole (1992) study the role of reputation
in enforcing bribe contracts in the presence of hold-up. These papers show that in settings
with repeated interactions, bribery can be sustained despite the possibility of hold-up.
However, it may not always be possible for an intermediary to repeatedly interact with
the same bureaucrat, and there are many instances in which one-shot (or occasional) bribe
contracts do occur despite the potential for hold-up. In the absence of repeated interactions
bribery may be sustained if the participants in the corrupt transaction can post hostages,
as discussed in the literature on incomplete contracts (Williamson 1983). Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) and Lambsdor¤and Nell (2007) show that leniency policies towards whistle-
blowers can enforce bribe transactions in the presence of hold-up. That is, by obtaining
hard evidence about the bribe transaction, the party vulnerable to hold-up can use it as
a hostage" and threaten to expose the illegal transaction (without fearing punishment
themselves) if they are held-up. Thus, these papers show that a poorly designed leniency
policy can sustain bribery even in the presence of hold-up.
Our paper is related to these papers in that we study bribery in the presence of hold-up
without relying on repeated play to enforce the bribe contract. However, instead of studying
hostage mechanisms we show that bribery can be sustained when the intermediary provides
both legitimate and illegitimate services to rms. In contrast to our paper, Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) assume that only rms that are not eligible for a permit pay a bribe. In our
model both eligible and ineligible rms have to pay bribes to obtain a license. Thus, bribery
is not necessarily welfare reducing because it may increase the number of eligible rms.
Following the introduction, the second section presents the benchmark model and derives
the equilibrium without intermediaries, the third extends the benchmark model to include
intermediaries. The fourth section considers various extensions and policy implications, and
provides a welfare analysis of the presence of intermediaries. The welfare implications of
eliminating intermediation are ambiguous and depend on various factors such as navigation
costs, court costs, degree of red tape. The nal section concludes.
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2 The model
Consider a model with three risk-neutral players rms, a monopolistic intermediary who
plays the role of a middleman, and a bureaucrat. Firms are of two types i = fg; hg, where g
refers to the good or eligible type and h refers to the harmful type (that is ineligible for the
license). There are total of ng and nh potential number of g and h type rms respectively,
where ni=fg;hg is a positive integer. Each rm receives a private value of v if it is granted a
license by a bureaucrat where v  U [v; v], with v  0; and v independent of fg; hg: With
slight abuse of notation we denote harm generated by the harmful types by h; where h > 0
is su¢ ciently large (relative to the distribution of v) so that all h type rms are welfare
reducing if they are granted a license.
The cost of obtaining the license (in order to realize the benet v) is 0, however, procuring
the license involves some additional navigation costs  > 0. Bureaucrats hired by the
government are paid a xed wage, not related to issuance of licenses. The cost to the
bureaucrat of processing a license from either type of rm is e > 0. Bureaucrats do not
receive any additional incentive payments for issuing licenses. We assume that both the type
of the rm and the rms v are observable by the bureaucrat.5 Bureaucrats are corruptible
and attempt to extort payments from g types and bribes from h types. Distinguishing
between these two forms of bribery is important because licenses should be issued to all g
types and to none of the h types.6
Turning now to the institutional framework, there is a court (or some higher authority)
that can be used to appeal the bureaucrats decision. Specically, if a rms license ap-
plication is rejected by a bureaucrat, the rm (or an intermediary acting on behalf of the
rm) may decide to appeal to this court at a cost . We assume that  is non-monetary,
therefore, the court cannot reimburse the rm for these expenses. If a g type appeals then
the court ensures that the bureaucrat exerts e¤ort e to grant the rm the license, whereas
a h type is never granted a license even if it appeals to a court. In addition, whenever the
bureaucrat has received a bribe from a good rm, the court nds enough evidence to impose
5It is possible to have a case where the bureaucrat knows the type but not the actual v of the rm. The
key result of the paper does not change, though the bribe determination process and some of the comparative
statics do change.
6The bureaucrat colludes with the h-type to issue a license in exchange for a bribe.
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Firms realize
valuation v
???? firms of type g and ??h
firms of type h sign a contract
with the intermediary to
procure licenses from the
bureaucrat	
Agree
Disagree
Bureaucrat
Intermediary and
Bureaucrat bargain
over a phased
bribe B and k.
Intermediary
No-court
?? = ????,?? = ??h
Figure 1.
Firms:(??- ????,	??h ),
Bureaucrats: - 	??????,
Intermediary: 	???????? +??h ??h - (?? + ????)
Firms:	(?? - ???? ,?? - 	??h ),
Bureaucrats: 0
Intermediary: 	???????? +??h ??h - ???? + ???? ??
No hold-up
for h types
Hold-up h
types only
Intermediary
Firms:	(??- ????,	- ??h ),
Bureaucrats: ??h + ??' - 	??????- ??,
Intermediary: 	???????? + ??h ??h - ??h -??' - (?? + ??h ??)
Court No-court
Firms:	(?? - ???? ,?? - 	 ??h ),
Bureaucrats: ??h
Intermediary: 	???????? +??h ??h - ??h - ???? - 	??h ??	
Firms: (??- ????,	??- ??h ),
Bureaucrat: ?? - (???? + ??h )??,
Intermediary: 	???????? + ??h ??h - ???? < ????,	?? < ??h
Game ends
Court
a, possibly small, but positive penalty f:7 Implicit in this framework is the assumption that
a g type rm that appeals to the court (after having paid a bribe) is granted immunity from
any penalties for bribery. However, full immunity is not necessary for our results, and this
assumption can be relaxed.
2.1 Corruption in the absence of intermediaries
As a benchmark, consider a model without an intermediary. The extensive form of this game
is given in Figure 1.
First, consider the bribe negotiation between the rm and the bureaucrat, which we
model as a Nash bargaining game. If an agreement is reached during the Nash bargaining
stage, the bureaucrat receives the bribe in exchange for agreeing to exert e¤ort (e) to process
the license. Thus, the Nash bargaining bribe is paid with the quid pro quo agreement that
the rm will be granted the license at some future stage. However, this Nash bargaining
solution cannot be enforced and a bureaucrat may hold-up the rm by not granting the rm
7Note that there is no ne if the bureaucrat has not issued the license but has not taken any bribe. This
is perhaps more realistic than the case where the court always nes the bureaucrat. Given that there are
di¤erent types of rms, it is possible for the bureaucrat to mistake a g type as a h type and deny a license.
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the license despite having accepted the bribe.8
Within the framework specied above, if a bureaucrat holds up a rm, a g type rm
will always choose to go to court. Since going to court results in a ne f; a bureaucrat will
never hold-up a g type rm. However, h type rms will never choose to go to court because
appealing to the court does not produce a license. Thus, h type rms will always be held-up.
Let x denote the bribe paid by a g type in exchange for license. Then the agreement and
disagreement payo¤s are
Firm Bureaucrat
agreement v      x x  e
disagreement v        e
Given the above payo¤s the Nash bargaining solution (assuming equal bargaining powers)
x will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product.
x = arg max
x=
( x= + )  (x=) = 
2
(1)
Thus, conditional on choosing to apply for a license, a g type rm will pay a bribe x = 
2
:
Since h type rms are always held-up, they will never pay a bribe in equilibrium, b = 0:9
Given this bribe game, we now turn to the entrepreneurs decision to apply for a license
(and enter the market). Note that a g type rm can credibly threaten to take the bureaucrat
to court only if v > : Further, the cost to a g type rm that chooses to apply for a license
is  + =2; therefore, a g type rm with v >  will choose to apply for a license only if
v >  + =2:
Under the assumption of sequential rationality, we solve for the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium of the above game using backward induction. It is clear that, for any g type
with v  maxf;  + =2g making the extortion payment (x = 
2
), going to court if held-up,
and the bureaucrat granting the license constitute an equilibrium. Further, it can be veried
that this equilibrium satises backward induction.
We now turn to rms with v < : In this case, a rm will never approach the court and
8The bureaucrat saves e > 0 by holding up. There can be several other reasons why hold-up might be
protable but we do not consider these and focus more on the implications of such hold-ups.
9It should be noted that, if bribing were enforceable then the Nash bargaining solution between a bu-
reaucrat an h  type will yield a bribe of v+e2 :
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consequently will always be held up by the bureaucrat. Irrespective of the outcome of Nash
bargaining, the bureaucrat has no incentive to incur positive cost and issue the license. Since
v is observable to the bureaucrat, any rm with v <  will not apply. We characterize this
simple equilibrium in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A g type rm applies for a license if and only if v  maxf; +=2g and h type
rms do not enter the market due to hold up.
Remark 2 If the navigation costs are small relative to the litigation costs (i.e.  < =2);
then the entry decision to apply for a license is only a¤ected by the litigation costs ; and
reducing the navigation cost  will not change the number of rms.
Navigation costs in our model may be interpreted as red tape, and it is often suggested
that lowering red tape can reduce bribery and increase e¢ ciency. Remark 2, however, sug-
gests an interesting nding regarding the e¤ectiveness of this policy. If the navigation costs
are low relative to litigation costs , then lowering these navigation costs will not increase
e¢ ciency by increasing the number of good rms that enter the market.
3 Corruption with monopolistic intermediaries
We now consider the role of a monopolistic intermediary (M) who can reduce the navigation
cost . Due to its familiarity with the system, the intermediarys cost of navigating the
bureaucracy to obtain a license is 0: A rm of type i = fg; hg and an intermediary sign a
contract where the rm pays mi to the intermediary in order to navigate the application
process (i.e. lower navigation costs to  = 0) and procure the license. This reects Brays
(2005) assertion that,
[b]y employing a local agent or a representative, companies can cut down the
time needed to get to know new markets and thus reduce the costs of operating
there. Intermediaries may also act as a bu¤er against demands for bribes: they
can make their decisions whether or not to pay, according to local custom.
We denote the actual number of applicant rms of type i by ki; where ki  ni: If the
intermediary succeeds in obtaining the license the game ends. However, if the bureaucrat
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holds-up the intermediary and does not grant the license, the intermediary incurs a reputation
cost of D > 0 unless the intermediary appeals to the court at cost T . These reputation costs
may reect lost business from future referrals from this rm. The cost is avoided if the
intermediary goes to court perhaps because it will be perceived as having made an honest
e¤ort to procure the license if it goes to court.10 Thus, there two aspects to appeals. The
rst occurs when an appeal is made by the intermediary (against the bureaucrat) for not
issuing a license. In this case, the court examines the appeal and bureaucrat is required to
grant licenses to the g type rms, while h type rms are not granted the license. The second
aspect to the appeal arises when, irrespective of the type of rm, an intermediary approaches
the court to avoid incurring costs D: Note that because the intermediary provides both types
of rms with a legitimate service (reducing navigation costs), the court cannot penalize it
for contracting with the h types:11
The intermediarys court costs take a specic form in that it depends on the number
of its client rms. Specically, there is a xed cost F that is incurred only once, and a
variable cost Z for each appeal that the intermediary chooses to make. That is, suppose
the intermediary has not gone to court for any of the 1; 2; :::n  1 license applications, then
the total cost of going to court for the nth rm is T = F + Z: On the other hand if the
intermediary went to court for any of the n= < n applications, then the cost of going to
court for each n > n= is T = Z:Obviously, these costs are related to the rms litigation
costs : It is reasonable to assume that F + Z >  > Z:
The logic behind this cost function is similar to that found in Gintis(2009) analysis of
a rms choice between hiring a lawyer only if it is accused of wrongdoing, and keeping a
lawyer on retainer" permanently. By maintaining a lawyer on retainer a rm incurs only
the marginal cost and not the xed cost for its legal defense, whereas by hiring a lawyer
only after it has been accused it must incur both the xed and the marginal cost of legal
fees. In our model, the intermediarys xed cost may be interpreted as the costs of hiring
a lawyer on retainer. Once these costs have been sunk, it incurs only the marginal cost for
10Alternatively, the intermediary and rm may include a damage clause in their contract. The clause may
state that: the intermediary shall pay the rm D in the event it fails to make su¢ cient e¤ort in procuring
the license."
11It may appear inconsistent that the intermediary is not penalized by the court for attempting to obtain
a license for the h types. However, we assume that the intermediarys knowledge of the rms type is soft
(not third-party veriable), therefore, it cannot be responsible for agreeing to lower the navigation costs of
either type of rm.
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each appeal.12
3.1 A market with g types
To understand how the presence of the intermediary a¤ects the market, we begin by study-
ing the equilibrium with only g types. In contrast to the game without an intermediary
where each rm negotiates independently with the bureaucrat, here the intermediary and
the bureaucrat negotiate over an aggregate bribe Bg that is paid in exchange for the licenses
of all the rms that the intermediary represents. We assume that this bribe is determined
through Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the bureaucrat. The time-line of the
game is outlined below and characterized in the extensive form game (see Figure 2).
1. In period 0 rms realize their value for the licence v: The intermediary chooses fees
mg:
2. Given their valuation v and the fees mg, kg number of g type rms sign a contract with
the intermediary to help lower negotiation costs and deliver the licenses.
12A similar cost structure is also found in Konrad and Skaaperdas (1997)
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3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate (through Nash bargaining) over an
aggregate bribe Bg in exchange for kg number of licenses to be granted. In the absence
of any agreement, the bureaucrat chooses whether to issue any license. If any of the kg
licenses are not issued, the intermediary can appeal the bureaucrats decision in court,
where the cost of going to court is T (described above). Since the rm is a g type,
the court instructs the bureaucrat to issue the license.
4. In the event of an agreement, bribe Bg is paid and the kg licenses are granted if the
bureaucrat chooses not to hold-up the intermediary. If the bureaucrat holds-up and
issues l < kg licenses, the intermediary must decide whether to go to court or not. If
the intermediary chooses not go to court, it will incur a cost of D from kg   l rms for
failing to procure the licenses on their behalf: If the intermediary appeals to the court,
the bureaucrat is forced to process the licenses and is penalized f for having accepted
a bribe. Conditional on going to court, the intermediary always avoids incurring the
reputation costs of D(kg   l).13
It is clear that in any equilibrium (satisfying subgame perfection) the bureaucrat never
holds up the intermediary and will always deliver the license (l = kg) if it expects the
intermediary to approach the court. Thus, assuming that D su¢ ciently large, which we
specify more precisely below, the intermediary will always approach the court if a license is
not delivered. Thus, there is no hold-up in this equilibrium with g types:
Turning to the Nash bargaining game, the disagreement payo¤s OB; OM for the bureau-
crat and the intermediary are given by
OB =  kge (2)
OM =  (F + kgZ): (3)
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for kg rms
resulting in the payo¤  (F + kgZ): The bureaucrats disagreement payo¤ reects the fact
that it will be asked to issue kg licenses. Assuming that the intermediary seeks licenses for
13This cost captures lost business from other potential clients due to negative referrals" from these rms.
Thus, the reputation cost here is di¤erent from the standard denition of reputation" within the context
of repeated games (as discussed in Mailath and Samuelson 2006).
13
kg rms, the bribe Bg will be given by the solution to the following maximization of the
Nash product.
Bg = arg max( B   ( F   kgZ))  (B   kge+ kge) = F + kgZ
2
(4)
Comparing this case with the model without intermediaries (eq 1), it is easy to see that the
presence of an intermediary a¤ects the rms costs in two ways. First, as discussed earlier
it reduces the navigation cost from  to 0: Second, if  > Z + F=kg; each rms extortion
payment (now paid through the intermediary) is also reduced. Thus, assuming that the
intermediary does not expropriate the entire surplus, a rms payo¤ will be higher in the
presence of an intermediary.14
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the benet to the rm from intermediation
depends on the total surplus generated by the intermediary and the exact division of this
surplus.15 As noted, this surplus depends on the size of the navigation cost  and the
di¤erence in legal costs (F + Z   (Z + F=kg) > 0); which depends on the number of rms
(kg). The number of rms, in turn, depends on the fees that the intermediary charges. Since
we assume that the intermediary is a prot maximizing monopolist, it chooses a fee that
maximizes its prots, given the above bribe. Firms take the fee as given and make their
entry decisions accordingly.
Assumption 1: The intermediary chooses the fee m, but the rm can always exercise its
outside option and apply for the license on its own.
Assumption 2: The intermediary knows the distribution of v, but an individual rms v is
private information, and that ng  (v mv )  1 at m =  + 2 ;where v = v   v:That is, v is
large enough so that even in the absence of an intermediary, at least one g type rm wants
to enter the market.
Proposition 3 Suppose all potential entrants are g types. Under Assumptions 1 - 2, with
su¢ cient number of potential rms (that is, there exists ng such that if ng  ng) interme-
14Note that even if the extortion payment is not reduced, the rm may still use an intermediariy because the
reduced navigation costs may o¤set a potentially higher extortion payment. Specically, if   Z+F=kg 2
the rm will prefer to have a middlemen.
15Hence,a monopolistic (as opposed to more competitive) market structure for intermediation is likely to
underestimate the gain to the good rms.
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diation is protable and the intermediary will set its fees,
mg = minf
v
2
+
Z
4
;  +

2
g:
In this case the number of g type rms entering the market will not be lower compared to the
case without intermediation.
Proof. Assumption 1 requires that the following incentive compatibility constraint be
satised,
 +

2
 mg:
Hence to set the fees, the intermediary solves the following maximization problem.
Max kg(mg) mg   F + kg(mg)Z
2
; subject to  +

2
 mg:
Using Assumption 2 we note that the expected number of rms that will enter the market
for a given m is,
kg(m) = ng  (v  mg
v
); where v = v   v: (5)
Combining the previous two equations, the intermediarys prot function is,
ng  (v  mg
v
)[mg   Z
2
]  F
2
: (6)
It can be shown that the solution to the rst order condition is,
mg =
v
2
+
Z
4
(7)
Note that the intermediarys prot is strictly increasing in m at m = 0: Thus, either the
prots are increasing in m for all m 2 [0;  + 
2
], in which case the solution is mg =  +

2
;
or the solution is an interior solution given by mg =
v
2
+ Z
4
: However, this solution does not
guarantee that the intermediarys prots are positive. Specically, if the xed costs F are
large, then the intermediarys prots may be negative when the number of rms is small.
We now show that under Assumptions 1 - 2, there always exists an ng such that for
all ng  ng the intermediary can make a positive prot. First, consider the case where
v
2
+ Z
4
 + 
2
; so that the optimal m = v
2
+ Z
4
: Since  > Z; Assumption 2 implies v
2
+ Z
4
< v:
A straightforward calculation shows that mg > Z2 ; or that the rst term in the intermediaries
prot function (6) is strictly positive. Thus, if
ng >
F
2
(v m
v
)[m  Z
2
]
= ng (8)
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the prot to the intermediary is positive. Second, consider the case where v
2
+ Z
4
> + 
2
; so
that the intermediary charges mg =  +

2
: In this case, it is easy to see that the rst term
in the intermediarys prot (6) is strictly positive. Following similar arguments, it can be
shown that there exists an ng such that for all ng  ng the intermediary can make a positive
prot.
To show that the number of rms will not be lower, recognize that the intermediary
chooses m such that + 
2
 m: Thus, at least as many (or more rms) will enter the market
with an intermediary than without.
3.2 Market with g types and h types
We now turn to a market with both g types and h types: Recall that in the absence of
intermediaries only the g types apply for a license, while the h types abstain from entering
the market because of hold-up. We now show that in the presence of an intermediary
h types may be able to avoid the hold-up problem and enter the market. Consider the
following time line that informally characterizes the extensive form game with both types.
The corresponding extensive form of this game is found in gure 3.
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1. In period 0 rms realize their their value for the licence v; drawn from the distribution
: The intermediary chooses fees mg and mh:
2. Given their valuation v and fees mg and mh, kg rms of type g and kh rms of type h
sign a contract with the intermediary.
3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate over the total bribe B and the total
number of licenses k = kh + kg to be awarded. They also agree whether to implement
the agreed contract in a single stage or in a phased manner. In a single stage contract
the bribe B is made in one payment, where as in a phased contract part of the bribe
Bh is paid for the kh licenses of the h types, and another bribe amount is paid later for
the delivery of the licenses for the g types. If there is no agreement, the intermediary
chooses whether to make any license application on behalf of the rms and whether to
approach the court.16
4. If the bureaucrat does not hold-up, k licenses are granted.
5. If the bureaucrat chooses to hold-up it issues l < k licenses. The intermediary must
then decide whether to go to court to avoid the costs D as a result of rms that have
been denied licenses: For the g types it can go to the court with an appeal for the
license to be granted. In this case the license is issued and the bureaucrat is ned
f if a positive bribe was exchanged. Conditional on going to court, the intermediary
always avoids paying the D.
6. If the bureaucrat and the intermediary agreed to a phased contract in stage 3, they can
renegotiate the contract for the remaining phase(s) following hold-up by the bureaucrat.
Having solved the game with only g types in the previous section, we focus our analysis
on the h types: Recall that for the h types; the intermediary cannot force the bureaucrat to
grant it the licenses, but it can approach the court to avoid having to incur costs D: As in
the case with g types only, we rst study the negotiation between the bureaucrat and the
intermediary using the concept of Nash Bargaining solution.
Let kh; kg be the number of h types and g types who have paid the required fees (mh;mg)
to engage the services of the intermediary. If the bureaucrat and the intermediary fail to
agree, the disagreement payo¤s will be given by
16Note that in the two-stage contract the intermediary pays the bribe before the bureaucrat issues the
licenses for the h types, therefore, the intermediary cannot hold-up the bureaucrat.
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OB =  kge (9)
OM =  (F + kZ) (10)
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for kg rms
resulting in the payo¤ (F + kgZ): For the h types, it will approach the court to avoid the
reputational costs D, leading to a payo¤ of  khZ: The bureaucrats disagreement payo¤
reects the fact that it will be asked to issue kg licenses. Assuming that M seeks licenses for
k rms, the bribe B will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product,
B = arg maxf[ B=   ( F   kZ)]  [B=   ke+ kge]g = F + kZ + khe
2
: (11)
Proposition 4 Suppose F > 2e, ng su¢ ciently large, and Assumptions 1-2 are satised.
There exists a two-phased contract where the intermediary pays Bh to receive kh licenses for
the h types, followed by Bg to receive kg licenses. In this case both types of rms enter the
market, and hold-up does not occur. The intermediary charges di¤erent fees to the two types:
mg =
v
2
+ Z
4
; mh =
v
2
+ (Z+e)
4
:
Proof. The details for this proof are provided in the Appendix, however, we provide the
basic intuition below. First, the intermediary pays a certain portion of the total bribe (B)
and receives a (mutuall agreeable) corresponding number of licenses. Once these licenses are
delivered, the intermediary pays the rest of the bribe to receive the other licenses. Since for
the g types, hold-up is not an issue (as seen in the previous section), it is natural that the
intermediary would like to get licenses for the h types rst. If the bureaucrat holds up any
h-types license, the intermediary goes to the court to avoid D and renegotiates the extortion
payment for the g types. Since renegotiated bribe goes down by F=2; the bureaucrat will not
hold-up as long as the gains from holding up (e) are small compared to F=2. It is important
that at least one g types follows the h  types, otherwise the intermediary will be left with
no leverage.17
17Although we focus only on a two stage bribe, several multi-stage contracts are feasible. Indeed, the
aggregate bribe B (as in 11) can be partitioned into several payments made at each stage. However, regardless
of the number of stages, the total bribe (in the absence of hold-up) must be equal to B: If hold-up were
to occur at some stage, the renegotiated bribe will always be always be reduced by F=2; regardless of the
number of stages.
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The determination of fees is identical to the previous case of only g  types: The interme-
diary can treat this as two separate problems subject to the constraint that kg > 1: For large
values of ng, it is clear that mg =
v
2
+ Z
4
: Similar calculations for the h types (see appendix)
shows that mh =
v
2
+ (Z+e)
4
: The condition F > 2e guarantees that the number of h types
seeking license will be positive.
Similar to the analysis in Section 3.1, we study the intermediarys prot function. First,
note that we must have v > mh;otherwise none of the h types would apply for a license.
Thus, it can be shown that the intermediarys prot is,
fng  (
v  mg
v
)(mg  
Z
2
)g+ fnh  (v  m

h
v
)(mh  
Z + e
2
)g   F
2
; (12)
which is strictly positive only if,
ng 
F
2
  fnh  (v m

h
v
)(mh   Z+e2 )g
(
v mg
v
)(mg   Z2 )
= ng: (13)
We study inequality (13) to understand the implications of the previous proposition.
Observe that (13) is weaker than the protability condition (8) for ng derived in proposition
3; that is, ng < ng: When ng  ng the intermediary receives the same prots from g types
because mg is the same regardless of whether both types of rms are present or absent, and
a strictly positive prot from h types:When ng 2 ( ng; ng); then the intermediary is able to
receive a positive prot from g types, when previously it would not have o¤ered its services
to good rms. Thus, in this case it receives positive prots from g types, in addition to the
prot it receives from h types. Consequently, its prots are always strictly higher in the
presence of both types of rms, which implies that whenever the potential number of good
rms (ng) is su¢ ciently large (> ng), it will also want to o¤er its services to h types. Second,
this result implies that are values of ng 2 ( ng; ng); where intermediaries would be absent in
the presence of only g type rms, but where they are present if there are both g and h type
rms. Thus, interestingly, when ng 2 ( ng; ng); the presence of h types increases the number
of g types that enter the market. The following corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 5 The presence of h type rms increases the range over which intermediaries
are willing to provide services for g type rms. Further, the intermediarys prot is always
higher from serving both types of rms.
Intuitively, in the absence of h types the intermediary o¤ers its services to g types only
when there are su¢ ciently many potential g types (i.e. ng su¢ ciently large) so that prots are
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positive. However, when both types of rms are present, the intermediary cross-subsidizes
the prots obtained from providing its services to h types; in order to provide its services to
g types even when there are relatively few g types present. Indeed, it is worth noting that ng
is decreasing in nh: Thus, an increase in the number of h type rms will reduce the minimum
number of g types needed for the intermediary to be protable.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 suggest that the intermediary will o¤er its services to both
types (and prevent hold-up among h types) when there are su¢ ciently many g types, when
navigation costs are high, and when bureaucratic e¤ort is low relative to the xed cost of
going to court (F > 2e). In general, we should expect that there will be su¢ ciently many
g types, otherwise, the regulator could simply prohibit this industry entirely (instead of
regulating it by granting only licenses to g types). Thus, we expect the condition that there
are su¢ ciently many g types to hold in most cases. Furthermore, it is not surprising that
the existence of high navigation costs will encourage the entry of intermediaries. What is
more interesting here is that bribery is more likely to occur when the cost of bureaucrat
e¤ort is low. This suggests that when the bureaucrats tasks are relatively easy to perform
but court costs are high, then intermediaries will be able to prevent hold-up and enable h
types to enter the market.
These results appear to be consistent with the empirical ndings of Bertrand et. al.s
(2007) study of drivers licenses in India. They nd that intermediaries help qualied (g
type) drivers and unqualied drivers (h type) drivers navigate the application process and
receive licenses. It is likely the case that there are probably a large number of individuals
who need licenses, thus, ng and nh are likely to be large.18 Further, bureaucratic tasks in
providing licenses appear to be relatively easy. However, the navigation costs were estimated
by individuals to be quite large since on average individuals estimated that they would need
to make 6 visits and interact with multiple bureaucrats in order to receive a licenses. Our
model suggests that in precisely these situations, intermediaries that serve both types are
likely thrive.
Lambsdor¤ (2011), discussing the ndings of Bray (2005), points out that intermediaries
are used for bribery most frequently in the retail sector and less frequently in oil, gas, and
mining. Presumably, the retail sector has a large number of rms, and further bureaucratic
e¤ort is likely to be small. In this context, our model predicts that we should expect to see
18A similar pattern is observed in the developmental sector where middlemen operate to help both qualied
as well non-qualied beneciaries of governments development schemes.
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intermediaries utilized to pay bribes more frequently in the retail sector.
From a policy stand point the previous proposition suggests that while lowering court
costs (F ) may help prevent bribery, making bureaucratic costs easier (lowering e) may not.
Further, the key nding of Proposition 4 is that intermediaries provide services to both good
and bad rms and that the good and bad rms have a symbiotic relationship with each
other. Thus, as Bertrand et. al. (2007) point out, bribery not only greases the wheels for
the good types, but it also generates costs to society by allowing harmful agents to obtain
licenses. Consequently, the overall welfare e¤ect depends on whether their positive impact
on good rms o¤sets their negative impact from introducing harmful rms. We study these
issues in the following section.
4 Welfare
In the absence of intermediaries, hold-up is a blessing-in-disguise" because it prevents cor-
ruption and entry of the h type rms.19 The previous sections have shown how intermedia-
tion can, under certain conditions, solve the hold-up problem and encourage corruption. In
this section we study the welfare implications of intermediaries.
Assume that v > e and that the harm h from the h types is greater than v: These
two conditions ensure that in the rst best world the regulator will want to grant licenses
to all g types and to none of the h types:Furthermore, with only g types, the number of
rms entering the market will always be greater with an intermediary than without. Thus,
presence of intermediaries is always welfare enhancing with only g types (see Proposition
3).20 The more interesting case is when there are both g and h types: Since the presence of
h types increase the range over which intermediaries provide services for g types, it suggests
that the welfare gain from g types will be realized for even smaller values of ng: However,
since the intermediary facilitates the entry of h types, the overall welfare implications of
intermediaries will be ambiguous when there are both types of rms.
Formally, with both types of rms, the social welfare (SW) in the presence of an inter-
19This is in sharp contrast to the hold-up problems in the context of legal contracts where, hold-up
possibilities can lead to under-investment.
20We assume that when mg =  + 2 , rms bribe the bureaucrat directly.
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mediary is given by
SW = ng
vZ
mg
v (v)dv +
v
nh
Z
mh
(v   h) (v)dv:
Under Assumptions 1 - 2, this above expression simplies to
ng
2v
((v)2   (mg)2) +
nh
2v
((v)2   (mh)2) 
nhh
v
(v  mh): (14)
Since h > v > mh > m

g; the above expression may be positive or negative.
In the absence of an intermediary, the social welfare is
v
ng
Z
+
2
v (v)dv;
which simplies to
ng
2v
((v)2   ( + 
2
)2): (15)
Combining these expressions, it follows that if
ng[( +

2
)2   (mg)2] > nh(v  mh)[2h  (v +mh)]; (16)
then intermediaries will be welfare enhancing.
Note that when the solution to mg is interior, then the left hand side of (16) is strictly
positive. Thus, the previous inequality will hold for some parameter values and eliminating
intermediaries may result in welfare losses to society.21 Hence, in this case it will not be
optimal to eliminate intermediaries, even though this reduces corruption.
It must be noted that when v is large, v
2
+ Z
4
will be large and the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding (so that mg =  +

2
). In this case, the benet to the g types vanishes
or becomes negligible. But we must be careful about doing such comparative statics because
without any g types the equilibrium with both types may not exist. Second, as v increases
it will most likely be greater than the harm h; violating our condition that for all h types v
< h.
We now study the comparative statics of 16.
21In the case of the following example, welfare is improved with an intermediary. v = 3; v = 1; Z = :5; e =
:2;  = 2;  = 1; h = 3; F = 4; ng = nh = 5: The net gain in social welfare with an intermediary is, 1:85, the
intermediarys prot is 7:11, the expected number of g types who enter the market 3:4, and h types 2:2: All
other constraints can also be shown to be satised.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that the number of good rms is large. There exists a   0; such
that for all  > ; the presence of an intermediary improves welfare. Furthermore, the
(welfare) gains from an intermediary are increasing in e, ; and :
Proof. We need ng to be large so that (16) is satised. The left hand side of (16) is
increasing in : Thus, for some su¢ ciently large  the presence of an intermediary will raise
welfare (relative to the case without an intermediary). Substituting the (interior solutions)
for mh and m

g; into this expression and taking the derivative yields the above results.
This proposition suggests that the welfare from allowing intermediaries to function is
larger when the navigation costs  are large because intermediaries eliminate these navigation
costs. Interestingly, this is despite the fact that intermediaries lower the navigation costs for
both good and harmful types. Further, the welfare gain from an intermediary is increasing in
the individual rms court costs () because rms are able to outsource" their legal expenses
to an intermediary and exploit the intermediarys economies of scale. Taken together, this
suggests that governments may want to permit intermediaries in situations where navigation
costs and court costs are large, but prohibit or limit them when these conditions do not hold
Oldenburg (1987) describes the role of intermediaries in facilitating bribe payments for a
land grant and consolidation program in India. Since the majority of farmers were eligible
for this program, presumably ng was relatively large. However, he notes that the government
took much care in minimizing the red-tape or navigation costs for farmers applying for this
program. Thus, consistent with Oldenburgs intuition, our model suggests that in this case
intermediaries would not be welfare improving. 22
Further, our model suggests that contracts in industries with signicant red-tape, inter-
mediaries will be useful as long as there are su¢ ciently many legitimate rms. In contrast,
if there are few legitimate rms, intermediaries will only enable the entry of harmful rms
into the industry. Industries such as real estate development and construction are known
to have multiple layers of red-tape (K & L Gates 2014). Our model suggests that in these
industries, intermediaries will improve welfare if the majority of these projects are from le-
gitimate rms. In contrast, in the case of granting drivers licenses discussed in Bertrand
et. al. (2007), their data suggests that are a signicant number of h types. Consequently,
intermediation would generate welfare losses rather than gains even though they lowered the
22Nevertheless, as Oldenberg notes, intermediaries foiled this by making farmers believe that the navigation
costs were much higher than they were in order to create a market for their services.
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navigation costs of g types.
Finally, observe that an increase in e (the bureaucrats cost of e¤ort) also raises the welfare
gains from an intermediary. This occurs because an increase in e increases the fee that the
intermediary charges the h types but does not a¤ect the fee that it charges the g types: Thus,
an increase in e reduces the participation of h types while not a¤ecting the participation of
g types; therefore, a higher e increases the welfare gains from an intermediary.
5 Conclusion
Intermediaries are frequently employed by rms in order to facilitate corrupt transactions.
Interestingly, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) explicitly recognizes this issue
by stating that the act imposes civil and criminal penalties for any U.S. person or corpo-
ration [making] a corrupt payment to any foreign government o¢ cial, directly or indirectly
to obtain or retain business(OMelveny 2009)". Data collected by the authors from the
U.S. Department of Justice from cases between 1998 and 2007 show that intermediaries were
employed in slightly over 40% of all corrupt transactions (among instances of corruption
where the D.O.J. brought charges).23 Thus, given this high frequency, many governments
are considering whether to prohibit intermediaries entirely.
In light of the relevance of this issue, this paper studies the role of intermediaries in
facilitating corrupt transactions. Although the previous literature has studied the role of
intermediaries in enabling corruption, none of these papers have examined the mechanism
through which intermediaries prevent hold-up. Our analysis of intermediation and hold-up
highlights the mixture of both legal and illegal services that the intermediary o¤ers, and
shows that it may be di¢ cult to separate these two aspects.
Specically, we show that in the absence of intermediaries only good rms enter the
market, and harmful rms are dissuaded from entering the market because bureaucrats can
hold-up their license applications. In the presence of intermediaries who lower navigation
costs, the number of good rms increase. Thus, if only good rms are present, and the
potential number of good rms is su¢ ciently large so that intermediaries can prot from
them, then intermediaries unambiguously improve social welfare.
23All details are available from: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html
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When both good and bad rms are present, we show that intermediaries can employ the
legal elements of their business (i.e. services to good rms) in order to prevent hold-up from
occurring to harmful rms. Intermediaries always receive a higher prot from serving both
types of rms and, therefore, procure licenses for both good and harmful rms. Thus, the
possibility of hold-up no longer prevents harmful rms from entering the market. Hence,
the legal arm of the middleman is pre-requisite for the illegal arm to function. Interestingly
however, because intermediaries prot from both types of rms, the existence of harmful
rms has a positive impact on the participation of good rms by making intermediation
on behalf of good rms viable for a larger range of parameter values. Thus, in contrast to
models of adverse selection where the bad drives out the good, in our model good and bad
rms complement each other through an intermediary. Specically, the presence of harmful
rms raises the protability of intermediation and makes it viable, enabling more good rms
to enter the market, and good rms in turn make it possible for harmful rms to avoid
hold-up, thereby encouraging more harmful rms to enter the market.
With regard to the welfare e¤ects, we nd that since more good and harmful types
enter the market in the presence of an intermediary, the welfare costs of intermediaries
are ambiguous in general. Specically, we show that as long as the navigation costs are
su¢ ciently large, and there are su¢ ciently many g types, intermediaries will enhance welfare
because the gains to the good rms can o¤set the costs from the harmful rms. Thus
eliminating intermediaries may not be benecial. This nding resonates with Lambsdor¤
(2011) who argues that in most cases prohibiting intermediaries is not good policy because,
"complete prohibition of intermediaries hinders rms from reaping the gains that
intermediaries might contribute. For example, if honest rms and good in-
termediaries are impeded by prohibition, public procurement may su¤er from
reduced competition, which is likely to reduce welfare."
Although our model considers a market with many rms, it can be interpreted more
broadly as a single rm with several license applications, some of which are legal and others
illegal. For example, a real estate developer may apply for several building permits, some
of which may be legal, while others illegal. Our model shows that these legal services can
be used as leverage against the bureaucrat in order to prevent hold-up among the illegal
applications. In fact, our analysis can be applied in several other contexts such as the delivery
of developmental goods and services, and the implementation of public programmes. In all
these contexts, intermediaries serve both as informational navigator and bribe facilitator.
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Our analysis shows that eliminating intermediaries is not the most e¢ cient way to reduce
corruption.
We conclude by discussing a few implications and extensions to our model. First, in our
model context, average bribe paid through an intermediary will be higher than those paid
without an intermediary. This result arises directly from the fact that intermediaries pay
bribes on behalf of both g and h types. Since h types have to pay higher bribes, the average
bribe paid through an intermediary may be higher. Interestingly, data collected by the
authors on violations of the FCPA support this nding. Specically, we nd that the average
bribe paid with an intermediary is 2,749,500 (USD) for U.S. companies and 582,314 (EU) for
European cases, while the average in the absence of an intermediary is $351,185(USD) and
173,583 (EU) respectively.24 Second, our model suggests that intermediaries and bureaucrats
will often make multiple bribe payments in order to avoid hold-up. Interestingly, in several
of these FCPA cases the bribes are paid in more than one installment.
Third, our paper implicitly assumed that intermediaries are granted leniency from bribe
giving. This is consistent with recent literature suggesting that legalizing bribe giving (for
some types of bribes) can reduce corruption (Basu 2011). However, this literature has not
examined whether such policies should be extended to intermediaries who pay bribes on
behalf of rms. It is straight forward to extend our model include a penalty for bribe giving
(for the intermediary). Suppose that there are only g types so that all bribes are extortionary
(or harassment bribes), which is consistent with Basu (2011) and Spagnolo (2004). Further,
assume that intermediaries are not granted leniency, but are ned fM > 0 when they go to
court to appeal the bureaucrats decision to not grant them the license. It can be shown
that if the reputation costs are su¢ ciently large D, then there all of the results of this paper
remain. However, if D is small (below F + kZ + fM), intermediaries will no longer want to
pay a bribe (because the bureaucrat will hold-up the license since the intermediary can no
longer credibly commit to go to court). In this case, rms will hire intermediaries only in
order to reduce their navigation costs. However, the fees charged by intermediaries will be
higher than when fM = 0; therefore, fewer g types may enter the market and welfare will be
lower without the leniency policy. Hence, extending leniency policies to intermediaries will
24However, it should be noted that these descriptive statics are unconditional means. An alternative
explanation may be that rms with high-value contracts use intermediaries, while those with low-value
contracts bribe directly. While this is certaintly plausible, it should be noted that most of the instances of
corruption in our sample involve large rms with very high value contracts. Nevertheless, given that we do
not present regression results that condition on contract value, we cannot rule out this possibility.
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never lower welfare.25
Fourth, the welfare analysis of the presence of the intermediary is robust to the consid-
eration of alternative information structures and bribe determination process. For example,
the bureaucrat may not have full knowledge of v, but may only know the type of the rm.
In this case, the bureaucrat determines the amount of extortion payment from the g types
as a monopolistic rm, to maximize total prot. In such a scenario, the bribe demand x
from the g type rms, in the absence of intermediaries, is x = v+e 
2
 : This is similar to
the fees charged by the intermediary and in the models context the g type rms are more
likely to benet from the presence of the intermediary. Thus, the welfare gains from the
presence of an intermediary will be true for a larger set of parameter values of litigations
costs, navigation costs, e¤ort and maximal value.
Finally, we have focussed on the case of a monopolistic intermediary. In many of the
examples discussed in the text, there are several intermediaries and it would be interesting
to see the implications of competition amongst the intermediaries. Competition is likely to
lower the fees and encourage more rms of both types. Hence the broad welfare consequences
are not obvious. We leave this extension for future research.
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6.1 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We prove the result in three steps.
(1) First, we show that there exists a phased contract where the intermediary rst pays
Bh for kh licenses for the h types, followed by Bg for kg licenses, where Bh = (khZ + khe)=2
and Bg = (F + kgZ)=2:
Suppose the bureaucrat holds up the intermediary and issues l < kh licenses in the rst
phase. This will cost the intermediary a total of (kh   l)D in reputation costs. Even if
there is only one h type; as long as D > Z + F
2
; the intermediary will choose to approach
the court to avoid D. Note that it only incorporates half the xed cost (F=2) because
the rest of this cost is recovered through the renegotiated bribe payments for the second
phase. (i.e. the renegotiated bribe falls by F=2)We assume that D satises this constraint so
that the intermediary can commit itself to go to court. Following hold-up, the intermediary
renegotiates the (second stage bribe) bribe for the remaining kg rms. This renegotiated bribe
is also determined through Nash bargaining, but disagreement payo¤s for the bureaucrat and
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the intermediary are nowOB =  kge andOM =  (kgZ) respectively. Hence the renegotiated
bribe is Brg = kgZ=2:
In the second stage, upon payment of Brg the bureaucrat will issue kg licenses. Hold-up is
not protable at this stage because the intermediary can always go to court to seek licenses
for the g types. Further, since a bribe has been exchanged, the bureaucrat will incur a
penalty f > 0: Hence, hold-up is never optimal. Since the bureaucrat does not hold-up in
the second stage, its expected payo¤ from holding up in the rst stage decreases by F=2;
but its benet from holding up is (kh   l)e: Since benets from holding up is maximized for
l = 0; hold up will not occur in the rst stage if F=2  khe; or 2khe  F:
(2) Hold-up will not be protable as long as kg  1: Recall that the equilibrium number
of rms of each type depend on ni and the fee mi: The fees charged must be large enough to
cover the intermediarys bribe payment B, which is additively separable in kg and kh: Thus,
the fraction of the bribe B ( see 11) that is allocated in the rst stage towards procuring the
licenses for the h types will not a¤ect the intermediarys prot maximizing choice of mg; and
in turn the number of g types that apply for a licenses (kg). Hence, the middlemans prot
from the h types will not depend on the number of g types (and vice-versa) and mg will
be determined exactly as in proposition 3. It can be shown that mg = minfv2 + Z4 ;  + 2g;
kg = ng  (v m

g
v
); and Assumption 2 ensures that kg  1: For large values of ng, mg = v2 + Z4 :
Next, we determine the fees that will be charged by the intermediary for the h types:
The middleman will choose mh to solve the following maximization problem.
Max kh(mh) mh   kh(mh)(Z + e)
2
; subject to kh(mh)  F
2e
:
Note that the constraint is the no hold-up" constraint that ensures that the bureaucrat
does not hold-up. A straightforward calculation shows that,
mh =
v
2
+
(Z + e)
4
(17)
Substituting this into the constraint implies that,
nh  (v  m

h
v
)  F
2e
: (18)
Condition F > 2e is clearly necessary to ensure that there are some h types in the market.
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